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Abstract
For financial regulators seeking to use regulatory requirements to manage risk in a banking
system, there can be a concern that such requirements crowd out efforts by banks to develop
their own risk management systems. One way in which regulators have attempted to solve
this problem is to enable banks to use internal risk models to satisfy regulatory
requirements. Beginning with the 1996 Market Risk Amendment, the Basel framework has
allowed banks to determine the capital charges associated with certain assets using their
own internal risk models. But allowing the use of internal risk models has not been without
controversy. Where some see an incentive for the development of internal risk management
systems better able to address the unique risk profiles of particular banks, others see
excessive complexity and uncertainty. And while some financial regulators are beginning to
subject banks’ models to greater scrutiny, questions remain about the ability of financial
regulators to provide effective oversight of such models.
__________________________________________________________________
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1. Introduction
For financial regulators seeking to use regulatory requirements to manage the risk in a
banking system, there can be a concern that such requirements crowd out efforts by banks
to develop their own risk management systems. Banks subject to regulatory requirements
may perceive the satisfaction of those requirements by itself as a sufficient response to risk.
Or banks may believe they lack the resources to both meet regulatory requirements and
develop their own risk management systems. Given that such systems, if robust, may be
more effective in dealing with the unique risk profile of a particular bank than blanket
requirements, there have been calls by regulators to “ensure that regulatory requirements
do not impede the development of sound risk management by creating perverse incentives”
(Bank for International Settlements 1995, 1-2).
One way in which regulators have attempted to solve the problem of providing effective
oversight of financial institutions without stunting the development of the financial
institutions’ own risk management systems is to enable banks to use internal risk models to
satisfy regulatory requirements. Beginning with the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord
to Incorporate Market Risk (commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment), the
Basel framework has allowed banks to determine the capital charges associated with certain
assets using their own internal risk models rather than standardized capital charges applied
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to different categories of assets. With
the capital charges produced by internal risk models typically lower than those produced
using the standardized approach, the opportunity to use internal risk models has been
widely seen as intended to incentivize the development of banks’ own risk management
systems.
But the incorporation of internal risk models as a cornerstone of the Basel framework has
not been without controversy. Where some see an incentive for the development of internal
risk management systems better able to address the unique risk profiles of particular banks,
others see “a subsidy to complexity,” which makes “risk more difficult to monitor and
manage, not less” (Haldane 2012, 17). With this complexity has often come uncertainty, with
a series of recent studies illustrating the fact that different banks’ models can produce very
different assessments of the riskiness of the same set of assets.
In response to growing concerns about the use of internal risk models, some financial
regulators are beginning to subject banks’ models to greater scrutiny. Yet questions remain
about the ability of financial regulators to provide effective oversight of such models given
their complexity and the difficulty government agencies face in hiring individuals with the
necessary expertise in risk modeling. Furthermore, some banks have complained about the
amount of resources necessary to respond to this added scrutiny, forcing some banks to run
parallel models—one for the banks’ actual use and one to satisfy financial regulators.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
history of internal risk models. Section 3 outlines the adoption of internal risk models as part
of the Basel framework. Section 4 discusses concerns that are emerging about the ability of
banks to manipulate their internal risk models to achieve desired results. Section 5
concludes with a summary of the current status of efforts by regulators to address the
concerns raised by internal risk models.
Questions
1. Is the incorporation of internal risk models into regulatory frameworks a positive
trend that incentivizes the development of banks’ own risk management systems or
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a negative trend that introduces too much complexity and subjectivity into such
frameworks (or neither of the above, some of each, etc.)?
2. Are financial regulators capable of providing effective oversight of banks’ internal
risk models?

2. History of Internal Risk Models
Some commentators date the introduction of internal risk models to the late 1960s, when
profound changes to the global economy produced a level of financial market turbulence not
experienced since the Great Depression thereby necessitating increased attention to risk.
Others argue that internal risk models date to the late 1970s and early 1980s, when high
market volatility caused large investment banks to establish risk management departments.
Regardless of the specific account selected, the common narrative is that at some point after
the economic stability of the 1950s and early 1960s, conditions of market stress caused
banks to pay increased attention to the amount of risk involved in their businesses.
Charles Sanford (then head of Resources Management and later CEO) at Bankers Trust
undertook early efforts to use modeling techniques to address this risk, developing along
with Dan Borge the “risk-adjusted return on capital” metric or RAROC in the late 1970s. This
measure compared the return produced by a transaction to the amount of capital that would
need to be allocated to the transaction as a buffer against risk. Because the RAROC model
determined this amount of capital based on its assessment of the maximum potential loss
that could occur during a fixed period of time, many consider Charles Sanford and Dan Borge
to be the fathers of the modern Value-at-Risk (VaR) model.
Market Risk Models
In 1994, the VaR approach became an increasingly popular way for banks to measure market
risk (i.e., the risk of loss due to fluctuating prices for assets) with the introduction of J.P.
Morgan’s RiskMetrics model. Widely disseminated by J.P. Morgan, the RiskMetrics model
became the basis for much of the market risk modeling that occurred during this period
(Nuxoll 1999). J.P. Morgan described the model as consisting of three basic components:
1. A set of market risk measurement methodologies
2. Data sets of volatility and correlation data used in the computation of market risk
3. Software systems that implement the methodologies using the data sets
At a very basic level, the RiskMetrics model involves the use of historical data to determine
an estimated volatility for each type of risk (interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, etc.)
associated with a given security and the correlation between the various types of risk. In its
technical document describing the RiskMetrics model, J.P. Morgan gives the simple example
of a U.S. corporation holding a government bond denominated in a foreign currency. Such a
bond would be subject to two different, but potentially related types of market risk—interest
rate risk (loss to the U.S. corporation resulting from a decline in the price of the bond due to
an increase in interest rates) and foreign exchange risk (loss to the U.S. corporation resulting
from a decline in the value of the foreign currency relative to the dollar).
Historical data can provide an estimate of the maximum amount that the price of the bond is
likely to drop over a given time period as a result of interest rate movement to a given degree
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of certainty (the interest rate VaR) and it can also provide an estimate of the maximum
amount that the foreign exchange rate is likely to drop over the same time period to the same
degree of certainty (foreign exchange VaR). But the total risk will not be simply the sum of
the interest rate risk and the foreign exchange risk if there is a correlation between these
two factors. Therefore, historical data also is used to determine the correlation between the
interest rate risk and the foreign exchange risk for this type of bond. Using the RiskMetrics
model, the corporation would have to determine the interest rate VaR, the foreign exchange
VaR, and the correlation between the two risk factors, before using a formula derived from
standard portfolio theory to calculate the total VaR for the bond. (For a detailed discussion
of the methodology underlying the RiskMetrics model, see Longerstaey and Zangari 1996.)
Figure 1: CreditMetrics Framework

Source: Gupton et al. 1997.

Credit Risk Models
J.P. Morgan also developed what became the industry standard for models measuring credit
risk (i.e., the risk of loss due to a counterparty failing to pay an amount owed), releasing
CreditMetrics in 1997 (Nuxoll 1999). While J.P. Morgan describes CreditMetrics as
“philosophically similar” to RiskMetrics, it notes one major difference in available data that
drives much of the divergence between the models. Whereas when measuring market risk
there is “an abundance of daily liquid pricing data on which to construct a model,” in the case
of credit risk there is “relatively sparse and infrequently priced data on which to construct a
model.” Therefore, “CreditMetrics seeks to construct what it cannot directly observe: the
volatility of value due to credit quality changes” (Gupton et al. 1997, iii emphasis in original).
The model does this by seeking to “balance the best of all sources of information in a model
which looks across broad historical data rather than only recent market moves and across
the full range of credit quality migration—upgrades and downgrades—rather than just
default.” (The basic framework is depicted in Figure 1.)
In its technical document describing the CreditMetrics model, J.P. Morgan gives the simple
example of a portfolio consisting of two bonds:
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•

Bond #1—BBB-rated, senior unsecured, 6% annual coupon, five-year maturity

•

Bond #2—A-rated, senior unsecured, 5% annual coupon, three-year maturity

To determine the credit risk associated with each of the bonds by itself, the CreditMetrics
model employs three steps tied to the three headings under the “Value at Risk due to Credit”
heading of the framework diagram: Credit Rating, Seniority, and Credit Spreads.
First, the bond issuer’s current credit rating determines the likelihood of a default or
migration to another credit rating within a given timeframe. Based on historical data,
CreditMetrics determines a “transition matrix” setting forth the percentage likelihood of a
given migration. For example, the sample transition matrix in Figure 2 indicates that there is
a 0.06% likelihood that a AAA issuer will be downgraded to BBB within one year but a 5.52%
chance that an A issuer would experience such a downgrade.
Figure 2: CreditMetrics One-Year Transition Matrix

Source: Gupton et al. 1997.
Second, armed with the percentage likelihood of a given credit migration, the CreditMetrics
model calculates the value change likely to result from such migrations. Value upon default
is determined based on historical data concerning rates of recovery in default given seniority
class. For example, the sample chart in Figure 3 based on one set of historical data indicates
that senior unsecured creditors can expect to recover an average of 51.13% of face value in
the event of default.
CreditMetrics determines value changes tied to non-default credit migrations by revaluing
the expected cash flows from a bond (periodic interest payments and principal payment on
maturity) using a discount rate tied to credit spreads between rating categories.
Third, with the likelihood of a given migration and the value change that would result from
such migration having been determined, CreditMetrics can produce an estimate of the
maximum value change to a given degree of certainty. For example, in the table of migration
probabilities and value changes in Figure 4, there is only a 1.47% chance that the BBB bond
in question will migrate to B, CCC, or default. To this degree of certainty, the value of the bond
will not fall below $98.10, or $8.99 below the mean of all scenarios.
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Figure 3: Recovery Rates by Seniority Class (% of face value, i.e., “par”)

Source: Gupton et al. 1997.

Figure 4: Calculating Volatility in Value Due to Credit Quality Changes

Source: Gupton et al. 1997.
The above steps concerned the calculation of the risk associated with a single bond.
Returning to our model portfolio of two different bonds, as with the calculation of market
risk by RiskMetrics, the total credit risk of the portfolio would not simply be the sum of the
individual credit risk of each bond unless there was no correlation between the probability
of credit migration and the resulting value changes of the two bonds. Thus, as with
RiskMetrics, CreditMetrics relies on a determination of correlation grounded in historical
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data. (For a detailed discussion of the methodology underlying the CreditMetrics model, see
Gupton et al. 1997.)
Despite having been introduced nearly two decades ago, there is evidence that the
methodologies underlying the RiskMetrics and CreditMetrics models continue to guide
internal risk modeling today. (For more on internal risk models, see the YPFS Case Study
Zeissler, et al. 2014C.)

3. Internal Risk Models and Basel
As discussed in greater detail in the YPFS Case Study Basel III A: Regulatory History
(McNamara, et al. 2014A), the Basel framework as initially established by Basel I was
directed primarily at credit risk. It wasn’t until 1996 that the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) addressed market risk with the Amendment to the Capital Accord to
Incorporate Market Risk (commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment). Perhaps
not surprisingly given its development during the same time period that banks were
becoming increasingly active in financial modeling, the Market Risk Amendment added not
only market risk to the Basel framework, but also the concept of allowing banks to use their
own internal risk models to make determinations of risk. As the BCBS noted, in developing
the Market Risk Amendment, it “took account of the fact that the risk management practices
of banks have developed significantly since the initial proposals [about incorporating market
risk into Basel] were formulated in the early 1990s.” Moreover, the BCBS expressed a desire
not to impede further development of these practices by establishing regulatory
requirements detached from banks’ own risk management systems (Bank for International
Settlements 1995).
As a result, the Market Risk Amendment provides banks with a choice between “two broad
methodologies” in measuring market risk. The first methodology is a standardized approach
based on risk measurements developed by the BCBS. The second methodology, available
subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions and the explicit approval of a bank’s
supervisory authority, allows for the use of internal risk models to determine risk
measurements. Among the conditions outlined by the BCBS for use of internal risk models
are:
•

Certain general criteria concerning the adequacy of the risk management system;

•

Qualitative standards for internal oversight of the use of models, notably by
management;

•

Guidelines for specifying an appropriate set of market risk factors (i.e. the market
rates and prices that affect the value of banks’ positions);

•

Quantitative standards setting out the use of common minimum statistical
parameters for measuring risk;

•

Guidelines for stress testing;

•

Validation procedures for external oversight of the use of models; and

•

Rules for banks which use a mixture of models and the standardized approach.

(Key elements of the different conditions are outlined in Figure 5.)
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With the development of Basel II, the BCBS expanded the ability to use internal risk models
to determine risk measurements to credit risk as well. (For an overview of the use of internal
risk models in measuring credit risk, see McNamara, et al. 2014D.)
Figure 5: Conditions for Using Internal Risk Models

Source: Bank for International Settlements 1995

4. Internal Risk Models and the Potential for Manipulation
Although grounded in similar approaches, the various internal risk models deployed by
different banks are comprised of a variety of components—risk measurement
methodologies, historical data sets, software systems, etc.—differences in any one of which
could result in models that, when presented with the same set of assets, arrive at very
different assessments of risk. While the BCBS has argued that “it is desirable to have some
diversity in risk modelling practices; if all banks modelled in the same way, they could create
additional financial instability,” it has also noted that “it is undesirable for banks’ capital
calculation inputs to generate excessive variation in risk measurement, as it would
undermine the credibility of capital ratios, distort the international playing field and hamper
the functioning of financial markets” (Bank for International Settlements 2013b, 3). And
indeed, in the wake of the financial crisis there have been a series of studies that show that
the risk assessments of banks’ internal models do vary drastically.
In December 2013, the BCBS released the results of Phase II of an analysis of banks’ trading
book risk-weighted assets (RWAs). This analysis presented 17 internationally active banks
in nine jurisdictions with 42 different hypothetical trading portfolios to “test for the impact
of differences in modelling across banks by controlling for portfolio composition” (Bank for
International Settlements 2013b). The 42 different portfolios consisted of both plain vanilla

77

Basel III C

McNamara et al.

and complex products in the five major asset categories identified by the BCBS: equity,
interest rates, foreign exchange, commodities, and credit spread.
According to the BCBS, individual positions contained within the hypothetical trading
portfolios generated wide variations in some instances, variations which narrowed
somewhat at the portfolio-level with more diversification. Still, even for the two most
diversified portfolios in the exercise, the capital requirements calculated by the different
models had a standard deviation of between 24% and 30% of the mean, a significant degree
of variation. The capital requirements calculated ranged from €8.6 million to €18.5 million
for one portfolio and from €6.3 million to €19.7 million for the other. Among the key drivers
of this variation were the length of the data period used in a given model and the method
used to aggregate general and specific risk (Bank for International Settlements 2013b).
These results confirmed the findings of Phase I of the BCBS’s analysis, which presented 15
internationally active banks with 26 hypothetical trading portfolios containing mostly
simple products. Even with these more straightforward products, the different models had
a standard deviation of 31% of the mean for calculated capital requirements of the most
diversified portfolio, with outcomes ranging from €13.4 million to €34.2 million (Bank for
International Settlements 2013a).
In August 2013 the European Banking Authority (EBA) released a second interim report on
a similar hypothetical portfolio exercise involving credit risk. The EBA’s exercise included 35
banks from 13 EU countries and involved low default portfolios consisting of central
government, credit institution and large corporate exposures. The EBA’s analysis found
“significant variation in the [risk weights] and [expected losses] across banks.” Drivers of
this variation include differences in definitions of default, differences in the granularity of
credit ratings used, and data limitations (European Banking Authority 2013).
With the potential for such wide variation of results based in significant part on the modeling
choices that banks make (such as the length of data periods used), there have been growing
concerns about the achievement of lower capital requirements through the manipulation of
models rather than through the actual reduction of RWAs. (For a detailed examination of one
possible case of such manipulation, see McNamara, et al. 2014D.)

5. Regulator Response to Model Manipulation
Particularly in light of the increased attention being paid to the complexity of internal risk
modeling and the variability or even manipulation that can result, some financial regulators
are beginning to subject banks’ models to greater scrutiny. For example in May 2014, the U.S.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced a major expansion of its
quantitative analysis function, focusing not only on enhanced evaluation of banks’ internal
risk models as required by Dodd-Frank, but also on the creation of the OCC’s own models to
vet the results of the banks’ models. The OCC’s staff of “quants”—the individuals charged
with the OCC’s modeling efforts—recently increased from 31 quantitative economists to 53
and from six research associates/financial analysts to seven after the financial crisis
(LaCapra 2014).
But the heightened regulatory scrutiny of internal risk models is not without detractors, even
among other financial regulators. An anonymous U.S. Treasury official interviewed for the
Reuters article announcing the OCC’s initiative characterized the effort as a waste of time,
owing in part to the fact that government quants lack the experience of their private sector
counterparts and would therefore be seconding-guessing models that they do not fully
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understand (LaCapra 2014). And indeed, recruiting and retaining experienced quants may
be a tall order for regulatory agencies when even starting salaries for quants at major
financial institutions are several times more than salaries for government quants. Notably, a
senior quant recently hired as part of the OCC’s push was poached from another agency, not
from the private sector (Ibid.).
Banks themselves have also been critical of the move by some financial regulators to take a
more active role in policing internal risk models. One major point of concern has been the
increasingly large amount of quantitative resources banks must devote to regulatory
compliance. The co-head of the quantitative group at Bank of America has estimated that
such compliance represents more than half of his group’s work (Andersen 2014). Similarly,
an industry headhunter believes that the amount of time quants spend on regulatory matters
has increased from 30% pre-crisis to 50%-60% today (LaCapra 2014). According to some
bankers, much of this additional work is unnecessary. An anonymous bank executive
interviewed for the Reuters article described weeks of back and forth with the OCC over
minor differences in model design that resulted in almost no difference in model outcome.
According to the executive, the bank now runs two models concurrently—its own version of
the model (which had already been approved by the Federal Reserve) and a different version
to placate the OCC (Ibid.).
Given the critical role internal risk models play in the Basel risk-weighted capital framework,
determining how to provide oversight is a key challenge for regulators moving forward. This
state of affairs raises the question of whether or not financial regulators are even in a
position to provide effective and efficient oversight of banks’ internal risk models. This
question is made even more urgent by the many new responsibilities being added to
regulators’ plates around the world.
Commentators have also proposed potential solutions that reduce the ability of banks to rely
solely on the results of their internal risk models. First, regulators could establish floors
below which capital requirements would not go regardless of the outcome of modeling. A
drawback of such an approach is that the higher the floor is set, the less Basel-driven
incentive there is for banks to invest time and resources in internal risk models. In extreme
examples where the floor is set at what capital requirements would be using a standardized
approach, there is no such incentive—using internal risk models to determine capital
requirements could only result in higher capital charges, not lower capital charges. Such a
situation would nullify one of the chief reasons for introducing the internal-risk-models
approach to the Basel framework, which was to incentivize banks to further develop their
own risk management systems given the promise of lower capital requirements.
Another potential solution is the strengthening of the leverage ratio as a credible backstop
to risk-based capital requirements. Based solely on a bank’s total exposures without any
adjusting for risk, the leverage ratio is intended to be simpler and more transparent than
risk-based capital requirements and is not subject to the same type of manipulation using
internal risk models. A bank manipulating its internal risk models to arrive at artificially low
risk-based capital requirements could still be reined in by a leverage ratio that is sufficiently
robust. Ultimately, given the difficulty involved in effectively overseeing banks’ internal risk
models and the potential problems with introducing model floors, it could be that the
leverage ratio is the most important element of Basel III for addressing bank capital.

79

Basel III C

McNamara et al.

References
Anderson, Leif. 2014. Regulation, Capital, and Margining: Quant Angle. January.
Bank for International Settlements. 1995. An internal model-based approach to market risk
capital requirements. April.
Bank for International Settlements. 2013b. Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme
(RCAP)—Second report on risk-weighted assets for market risk in the trading book. December.
Bank for International Settlements. 2013a. Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme
(RCAP) Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book. July.
European Banking Authority. 2013. Interim results update of the EBA review of the consistency
of risk-weighted assets. August.
Gupton, Greg et. al. 1997. CreditMetrics—Technical Document. April.
Haldane, Andrew. The Dog and the Frisbee. August.
LaCapra, Lauren Tara. 2014. “Exclusive: U.S. banking regulators hire math geeks of their
own.” Reuters. May.
Longerstaey, Jacques and Peter Zangari. 1996. RiskMetrics—Technical Document 4th edition.
December.
McNamara Christian M., Thomas Piontek, and Andrew Metrick, 2014A. “Basel III A:
Regulatory History” Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2014-1A-V1, November.
McNamara Christian M., Natalia Tente, and Andrew Metrick, 2014D. “Basel III D: Swiss Finish”
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2014-1D-V1, November.
Nuxoll, Daniel. 1999. “Internal Risk-Management Models as a Basis for Capital
Requirements.” FDIC Banking Review 12, no 1:18–29. (Nuxoll 1999)
Zeissler Arwin G. and Andrew Metrick, 2014C. “JP Morgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits,
Metrics and Models,” Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2014-2C-V1, December.

Development of this case has been supported by a generous grant from the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation to the Yale Program on Financial Stability.
Copyright 2014, 2015, 2020 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this
material or to receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the
Yale Program for Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

80

